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ABSTRACT 
The ability to distribute cryptographic keys securely has been a challenge 
for centuries.  The Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol was the first practical 
solution to the key exchange dilemma.  The Diffie-Hellman protocol allows two 
parties to exchange a secret key over unsecured communication channels 
without meeting in advance.  The secret key can then be used in a symmetric 
encryption application, and the two parties can communicate securely.  However, 
if the key exchange takes place in certain mathematical environments, the 
exchange becomes vulnerable to a specific man-in-the-middle attack, first 
observed by Vanstone [1].  We explore this man-in-the-middle attack, analyze 
countermeasures against the attack, and extend the attack to the multi-party 
setting. 
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The ability to communicate securely has been a challenge for millennia.  
For as long as people have tried to exchange private information, others have 
tried to compromise their privacy.  In the modern communications environment, 
radio frequency communications and worldwide digital networks, such as the 
Internet, compound the problem.  Both are susceptible to eavesdropping, often 
times trivially.  By simply placing an antenna in the region of a radio frequency 
broadcast or tapping a wire anywhere between two nodes on a digital network, 
an uninvited third party can easily gain access to seemingly private 
correspondence.  The field of cryptography—the practice and study of hiding 
information—has made enormous progress combating the eavesdropping threat. 
Cryptography and encryption/decryption methods fall into two broad 
categories: symmetric and public key.  In symmetric cryptography, sometimes 
called classical cryptography, parties share the same encryption/decryption key.  
Therefore, before using a symmetric cryptography system, the users must 
somehow come to an agreement on a key to use.  An obvious problem arises 
when the parties are separated by large distances, which is commonplace in 
today’s worldwide digital communications.  If the parties did not meet prior to 
their separation, how do they agree on the common key to use in their crypto 
system without a secure channel?  They could send a trusted courier to 
exchange keys, but that is not feasible, if time is a critical factor in their 
communication.   
The problem of securely distributing keys used in symmetric ciphers has 
challenged cryptographers for hundreds of years.  If an unauthorized user gains 
access to the key, the cryptographic communication must be considered broken.  
Amazingly, in 1977, Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman published a paper in 
which they presented a key exchange protocol that provided the first practical 
solution to this dilemma.  The protocol, named the Diffie-Hellman key exchange 
(or key agreement) protocol in their honor, allows two parties to derive a common 
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secret key by communications over an unsecured channel, while sharing no 
secret keying material a priori [2].  While Diffie and Hellman have received 
recognition for creating the protocol, it later emerged that the Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), a British intelligence agency, had 
independently invented a similar protocol a few years before Diffie and Hellman 
published their breakthrough paper. However, the British government classified 
their findings and the results were not released to the public until 1997 [3].   
The Diffie-Hellman protocol relies on the difficulty of solving discrete 
logarithms in finite fields and the related intractability of the Diffie-Hellman 
problem.  Due to the difficulty of solving these mathematical problems, an 
eavesdropper is unable to compute efficiently the secret key with any or all of the 
information intercepted in the open communication channel.  Once the secret key 
has been exchanged successfully between the two parties, they may proceed by 
using the key in their symmetric crypto system. 
Before conducting the key exchange using the Diffie-Hellman protocol, the 
parties must agree on a prime number that defines the mathematical 
environment in which the key exchange will take place.  If the prime number is 
large enough, a brute force attack to find the secret key becomes infeasible.  
However, if the two parties agree on certain prime numbers, an active adversary 
can compromise their communication.  Using number theory, a man-in-the-
middle attack becomes possible if the prime number that defines the environment 
can be broken down into the form of 1p Rq  , where R  is a “small” integer and 
q  is a “large” prime.  If possible, the attacker can then modify the messages 
between the two parties so that they will both derive a key that belongs to a 
subgroup of size R .  If R  is small enough, the attacker can search the keyspace 
in a reasonable amount of time, determine the key the parties agreed to, and 
eavesdrop on their communication. 
 
  3
This thesis investigates the Diffie-Hellman protocol and the difficulty of the 
discrete logarithm problem the protocol relies on.  We then analyze the man-in-
middle attack described above by developing an algorithm to conduct the attack, 
estimate the complexity involved in executing the attack, and approximate the 
amount of prime numbers that are vulnerable.  We then consider several 
proposed methods to defend against the attack and demonstrate their 
effectiveness.  Finally, we extend the attack to several multi-party variants of the 
protocol and demonstrate their potential vulnerability. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND REVIEW 
Before beginning a discussion of the Diffie-Hellman protocol and the man-
in-the-middle attack, we investigate and present some basic definitions and 
theorems. This information is available in any standard algebra text, such as 
Fraleigh’s Abstract Algebra [4], or discrete mathematics text, such as Rosen’s 
Discrete Mathematics and Its Applications [5].  It is assumed the reader is 
familiar with common mathematical, logical, and set notation.   
We conclude the chapter with a brief discussion of computational 
complexity and primality testing, which will be useful in our analysis of the man-
in-the-middle attack. 
A. NUMBER THEORY  
If a  and b  are integers and 0a  , we say that a  divides b  if there is an 
integer c  such that b ac .  When a  divides b  we say that a  is a factor of b  and 
that b  is a multiple of a .  The notation a b  denotes a  divides b .  Given two 
integers a  and b , both non-zero, the largest integer d  such that d a  and d b  is 
called the greatest common divisor of a  and b .  The greatest common divisor of 
a  and b  is denoted by gcd( , )a b .  The integers a  and b  are relatively prime, if 
their greatest common divisor is one. 
Every positive integer greater than one is divisible by at least two integers, 
itself and one.  If these are its only factors, we call this integer prime.  A positive 
integer that is greater than one, and not prime, is called composite.  The primes 
are the building blocks of positive integers.  The Fundamental Theorem of 
Arithmetic states that every positive integer greater than one can be written 
uniquely as a product of two of more primes, where the prime factors are written 
in order of nondecreasing size.  Given a positive integer, n , let the prime 











In some situations, we care only about the remainder of an integer when it 
is divided by some specified positive integer, denoted by m .  If a  and b  are 
integers, then a  is congruent to b  modulo m  if m  divides a b .  We use the 
notation a b  (mod )m  to indicate that  a  is congruent to b  modulo m .  Note that 
a b  (mod )m  if and only if (mod ) (mod )a m b m .  Also, if n  divides a  then a  is 
congruent to zero modulo n .   
The great French mathematician Pierre de Fermat (1601–1655) 
demonstrated that the congruence  
 1 1pa    (mod )p  
holds when p  is a prime, and this gives us a theorem that will prove crucial in 
our analysis of the man-in-the-middle attack. 
Fermat’s Theorem [4]: If a  and p  is a prime not dividing a , then p  
divides 1 1pa   , that is, 1 1pa    (mod )p .   
Euler gave a generalization of Fermat’s theorem, but we must first define 
Euler’s Totient Function.  Commonly referred to as Euler’s Phi Function, the 
function gives the number of integers less than or equal to n  which are relatively 


















      
Euler’s Theorem [4]:  If a  and is relatively prime to n , then ( ) 1na   is 
divisible by n , that is, ( ) 1na   (mod )n .   
In several cases, this thesis will involve systems of linear congruences.  
The Chinese Remainder Theorem [CRT], named after the Chinese heritage of 
problems involving systems of linear congruences, states that when the moduli of 
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a system of linear congruences are pairwise relatively prime, there is a unique 
solution of the system modulo the product of the moduli.   
[CRT] [5]:  Let 1 2, ,..., nm m m  be pairwise relatively prime positive integers and 














has a unique solution modulo 1 2... nm m m m .  (That is, there is a solution x  with 
0 x m  , and all other solutions are congruent modulo m  to this solution.) 
B. GROUP THEORY 
A group ,G   is a set G , closed under a binary operation  , such that 
the following axioms are satisfied: 
Associativity:  For all , ,a b c G , ( ) ( )a b c a b c      
Identity:  There is an element e  in G  such that for all x G , 
e x x e x    . 
Inverse:  Corresponding to each a G , there is an element 'a  in G  such 
that ' 'a a a a e    .   
A group that also satisfies the commutative property is referred to as an abelian 
(or commutative) group. 
 Commutativity:  For all ,a b G , a b b a   . 
A group G  is said to be a finite group, if the set G  has a finite number of 
elements.  In this case, the number of elements is called the order of G , 
denoted by | |G .  This thesis is interested only in finite groups. 
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If a subset H  of a group G  is closed under the binary operation of G  and 
if H  with the induced operation from G  is itself a group, then H  is a subgroup of 
G .  We shall let H G  or G H  mean that H  is a subgroup of G , and H G  
or G H  shall mean H G  but H G . 
An example of a group is the set of congruence classes of the integers 
modulo n .  Given a positive integer n , we denote a congruence class by 
n
a  
which is the set of all integers congruent to a  modulo n .  The set of congruence 
classes of n  is denoted by 
         0 , 1 ,..., 2 , 1n n n n nn n    
This set forms a group under addition where      n n na b a b    and is denoted 
by ,n  .  We can easily inspect a group using a group table.  Table 1 is a 
group table for 5  under addition.  The elements of 5  are the column and row 








Table 1.   Group Table for 5 ,  
If n  is a prime p , then the set   * 0p p p    forms a group under 
multiplication modulo n .  It is a necessary requirement to remove the zero class 
because zero has no inverse under multiplication.  * ,p  , the multiplicative 
group of the set of congruence classes of prime integers, is the structure we will 
+ 0 1 2 3 4 
0 0 1 2 3 4 
1 1 2 3 4 0 
2 2 3 4 0 1 
3 3 4 0 1 2 
4 4 0 1 2 3 
  9
be focusing on in this thesis.  The Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol sets this 
group as the environment for the key agreement.  If we remove the zero element 
from the previous example, we have another group table (Table 2), this time with 
multiplication as the binary operation.  
 
• 1 2 3 4 
1 1 2 3 4 
2 2 4 1 3 
3 3 1 4 2 
4 4 3 2 1 
Table 2.   Group Table for * ,p   
Let G  be a group and let a G .  Then the subgroup  na n  of G  is 
called the cyclic subgroup of G  generated by a , and is denoted by a .  Further, 
a  generates G  if a G .  A group G  is cyclic if there is some element a  in G  
that generates G .   
The group * ,p   is always cyclic.  An important property of cyclic groups 
is that every subgroup of a cyclic group is also cyclic.  Another important property 
of groups in general is the Theorem of Lagrange. 
Lagrange’s Theorem [4]:  Let H  be a subgroup of a finite group G .  
Then the order of H  is a divisor of the order of G . 
This powerful theorem makes the attack we will analyze later possible.  
We know the order of * ,p   is 1p  .  The two properties mentioned above tell 
us that any subgroup of * ,p   will also be cyclic and the order of the subgroup 
will be a divisor of 1p  .   
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C. FIELD THEORY 
A field , ,F   , is a set F  together with two binary operations, which we 
will call addition and multiplication, defined on F  such that the following axioms 
are satisfied: 
Addition:  ,F   is an abelian group.   
Multiplication:  *,F   is an abelian group.   
Distributive:  For all , ,a b c F , ( ) ( ) ( )a b c a b a c      .   
A field F  is said to be a finite field, if the set F  has a finite number of elements.  
If F  is a finite field, then the multiplicative group is cyclic.   
For every prime p  and positive integer n , there is exactly one finite field 
(up to isomorphism) of order np .  This field ( )nGF p  is usually referred to as the 
Galois field of order np .  Oftentimes, the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol 
is described using the environment ( )GF p  instead of the group *p .  In the group 
theory section, we described the notion of a generator of a cyclic group.  In field 
theory, specifically in ( )GF p , the same element that will generate the entire 
multiplicative group is known as a primitive root.  The number of primitive roots of 
a field ( )GF p  is ( ( )) ( 1)p p    . 
D. COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY 
Before the discussion of primality testing, it is important to understand 
what makes one test more efficient than another.  Computational complexity 
involves the study of the efficiency of algorithms based on the time and memory 
space required to solve a problem of a particular size [5].  Usually, complexities 
are expressed using the Big-O notation. 
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Definition [5]:  Let f  and g  be functions from the set of integers or the 
set of real numbers to the set of real numbers.  We say that ( )f x  is ( ( ))O g x  if 
there are constants C  and k  such that  
 ( ) ( )f x C g x  
Whenever x k .  [This is read as “ ( )f x  is big-oh of ( )g x .”] 
This notation is extremely helpful when comparing algorithms, such as the 
primality tests we will discuss.  We will use the Big-O notation as an upper bound 
on the amount of operations a test will require.  In general, the smaller the upper 
bound, the more efficient the test is.  The more efficient the test is, the quicker it 
can complete the required steps of an algorithm and give an answer.  Thus, 
using the Big-O notation, we can often quickly decide which test will finish 
soonest, using fewer resources and less computer time. 
The most commonly used functions in Big-O notation are: 
 21, log , , log , , 2 , !nn n n n n n  
It is shown that each function in the list is smaller than the succeeding 




Figure 1.   Growth of Functions Used in Big-O Estimates [From 5] 
Notice the vertical axis scale is logarithmic, doubling each unit.  This 
causes the exponential function 2n  to appear as a straight line.   
An algorithm that is Big-O of a constant has constant complexity.  An 
algorithm that is Big-O of a logarithm has logarithmic complexity, and so on.  




Complexity                    Terminology 
(1)O                             Constant complexity 
(log )O n                       Logarithmic complexity 
( )O n                             Linear complexity 
( )bO n                           Polynomial complexity 
( )nO b                           Exponential complexity 
( !)O n                            Factorial complexity 
Table 3.   Computational Complexity Terminology [From 5] 
The algorithms we will be concerned with are of polynomial and 
exponential complexity.  The difference between the two can be enormous.  
Polynomial or better complexities are called tractable, because it is assumed 
that given a reasonably-sized input, the algorithm will produce an answer in a 
reasonable amount of time.  On the other hand, exponential complexities or 
worse are called intractable.  This is because an extremely large amount of time 
is usually required to run the algorithm.  However, a polynomial complexity 
algorithm with a very high degree might take longer to run than an exponential 
complexity algorithm with a small base.   
E. PRIMALITY TESTING 
We now turn to a topic of critical importance in our analysis of the man-in-
the-middle attack.  Suppose a large integer is given.  How might we quickly be 
able to tell if the number is prime or composite?  Mathematicians have studied 
this question for millennia, and recently this question has become even more 
important as modern computing power has granted the ability to test theories on 
a scale that was at one point inconceivable.  A primality test is an algorithm for 
determining whether an input number is prime.  Primality tests can be divided 
into two main groups:  deterministic and probabilistic.  Deterministic primality 
tests prove with certainty whether a number is prime or composite.  Probabilistic 
primality tests tell us a number is composite or probably prime.  If a probabilistic 
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method returns the number is composite, the number is definitely composite.  
However, if it returns the number as prime, there is a controllably small chance 
the number is actually composite [6].   
Primality testing is currently a topic of great interest and research and is, 
therefore, very dynamic.  We provide descriptions of several deterministic and 
probabilistic algorithms as background for the reader.  It is by no means a 
comprehensive discussion of every algorithm available.  Rather, we use this 
section as a way to motivate our choice of a primality test for later on when we 
will need to quickly determine if a given number is prime.   
1. Deterministic Primality Tests  
a. Trial Division 
The simplest primality test is trial division.  Trial division is the 
method of sequentially trying test divisors into a number n  so as to partially or 
completely factor n  [6].  We start with the first prime number, 2, and try to divide 
n  by 2.  If 2 divides n , we know n  is composite and can stop.  If 2 does not 
divide n , we try the next prime number, 3.  If 3 divides n , we stop.  If not, we try 
the next prime, and so on.  When we reach a trial divisor that is greater than the 
square root of n , we may stop.  If no prime up to the square root of n  divides n , 
then we declare n  a prime.   
This test is quite computationally intensive.  Let ( )t  be the prime 
counting function, which counts the number of primes t .  Trial division 
requires (in the worst case) about   2ln nn n   divisions, if the primes to n  are 
stored in a database, or even 
2
n  divisions, if the primes are not stored before 
the test starts. 
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b. The n–1 Test 
Trial division can be used to test small numbers for primality, but for 
larger numbers there are better methods [6].  The 1n  test is based on Fermat’s 
little theorem, and suggests that we try to factor 1n , not n .  In 1876, E. Lucas 
turned Fermat’s little theorem into a primality test.   
Lucas’ Theorem [6]:  If ,a n  are integers with 1n  , and  1 1na    (mod )n , 
but ( 1)/n qa   is not congruent to 1, modulo n  for every prime | 1q n  , then n  is 
prime. 
The most difficult step in implementing the Lucas test is finding the 
complete factorization of 1n .  Pocklington strengthened the result by realizing a 
partial factorization would suffice [6].  In particular, say  
1n FR  , and the complete factorization of F  is known.  (1) 
Pocklington’s Theorem:  Suppose (1) holds and 1 1na    (mod )n  and 
( 1)/gcd( 1, ) 1n qa n    for each prime |q F .  Then every prime factor of n  is 
congruent to 1 (mod )F .  (2) 
Corollary (n-1 test):  If (1) and (2) hold and F n , then n  is prime. 
Several results have allowed a smaller value of F .  These include 
work done by Brillhart, Lehmer, Selfridge, Konyagin, and Pomerance [6].   
The Lucas test and variations of it have a running time of about  
 3(log )O n .  The question of finding the “right” base still remains. 
c. Elliptic Curve Primality Proving 
Elliptic Curve Primality Proving (ECPP) is a class of algorithms that 
provide certificates of primality using sophisticated results from the theory of 
elliptic curves.  A detailed description of the background, theory, and 
implementation of the ECPP can be found in Atkin and Morain [7].   
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ECPP is the fastest known general-purpose primality-testing 
algorithm.  ECPP has a running time of  4(log )O n [7].     
d. The AKS Test 
In August 2002, the Agrawal-Kayal-Saxena (AKS) primality test 
was published in a paper titled “Primes is in P” [8].  The result was highly 
celebrated because of the four properties the test satisfies:   
1) It can be used to verify the primality of any given number.   
2) The maximum running time is polynomial. 
3) The algorithm is deterministic, not probabilistic 
4) The algorithm is not conditional on an unproven hypothesis. 
There are other algorithms that satisfy three of the four properties, 
but AKS is the only known test to satisfy all four.   
The test is based upon the equivalence 
 ( ) ( )n nx a x a    (mod )n  
for a  coprime to n , which is true if and only if n  is prime.  This is a generalization 
of Fermat’s Little Theorem and constitutes a primality test by itself.  However, the 
verification of primality would take exponential time, and thus, requires 
improvement.  The AKS test makes use of a related equivalence 
 ( ) ( )n nx a x a    (mod , 1)rn x  . 
This equivalence can be checked in polynomial time, with the complexity of the 
original algorithm being  12(log )O n . However, recently the complexity has been 
brought down to  6(log )O n  [9].  
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2. Probabilistic Primality Tests  
a. Fermat Primality Test 
Based on Fermat’s Little Theorem, the Fermat Primality Test is a 
probabilistic primality test that is the basis for the Miller-Rabin primality test used 
later on in the thesis.   
Recall that by Fermat’s Little Theorem, if p  is prime and p  does 
not divide a , then 1 1pa    (mod )p .  If we want to test if a given integer n  is 
prime, we compute 1na   (mod )n  for several values of a .  If the result is not 1 for 
some value of a , then n  is composite.  If the result is 1 for many values of a , 
then we can say that n  is probably prime.   
The reason we can only say probably is because the congruence 
1 1na    (mod )n  may hold when n  is composite.  A composite number n  is a 
(Fermat) pseudoprime, if the congruence 1 1na    (mod )n  holds [6].  
Unfortunately, for the Fermat Primality Test, there are infinitely many numbers 
that the test would call probably prime even if every value of a  was computed [6].  
These numbers are the so-called Carmichael numbers and give us reason to 
look for a test that will only give pseudoprimes for a fixed fraction of the bases 
attempted.  The Miller-Rabin test accomplishes this goal.   
b. Miller-Rabin Primality Test 
The Miller-Rabin Primality Test is an efficient probabilistic algorithm 
to test for primality based on the idea of strong pseudoprimes.  Consider an odd 
composite number n  and 1 2sn d    with d  odd.  n  is a strong pseudoprime if 
either 1da   (mod )n  or 2 1rda     (mod )n  with 0,1,... 1r s  .  The Carmichael 
numbers are Fermat pseudoprimes for every base.  However, a composite 




The algorithm is as follows: 
Choose a random integer [2, 2]a n  .  If 1da   (mod )n  and 
2 1
rda     (mod )n  for all 0,1,... 1r s  , then a  is called a witness and n  is 
composite.  Otherwise, n  is a strong probable prime to base a .  
If 9n   and is odd composite, the probability that the algorithm will 
fail to produce a witness for n  is 1/ 4 .  The probability that we fail to find a 
witness after k  iterations is 1/ 4k  [6].  We can make this probability as small as 
we desire with a large number of iterations.  For instance, if we wanted to ensure 
the probability of calling a composite number a prime is less than 610 , we must 
compute 10 iterations or more.   
As an example, suppose we wanted to determine if the number 341 
is prime.  First we write 2341 1 340 2 85    .  So 2s   and 85d  .  We randomly 
select 38a   and proceed with: 
85mod 38 mod 341 56 1da n     
02 85mod 38 mod341 56 1da n n     
12 170mod 38 mod341 67 1da n n    . 
Since none of the congruences hold, we know 341 is composite.  In 
fact, 341 11 31  .  However, consider 703n   and 3a  .  1703 1 702 2 351    .  
So 1s   and 351d  .  Continuing: 
351mod 3 mod 703 702 1da n     
02 351mod 3 mod 703 702 1da n n     
By the second congruence, 703  is a strong pseudoprime base3 .  If 
we then try 5a  , we get: 
351mod 5 mod 703 438 1da n     
02 351mod 5 mod 703 438 1da n n    . 
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This time neither congruence holds, and we know 703  is a 
composite number.  In fact, 703 19 37  . 
The Miller-Rabin test is very fast and has a complexity of 
 3(log )O n .  Of course, because it is probabilistic, there is a chance of the test 
returning a number as prime when it is in fact composite.  However, as will be 
demonstrated later, we are very concerned with the speed of the primality test 
and no deterministic test will run fast enough for our purpose.  The Miller-Rabin 
test offers us both speed, as compared to other primality tests, and the ability to 
control the probability of error and will be our tool of choice.   
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III. DIFFIE-HELLMAN AND THE DISCRETE LOGARITHM 
A. THE DIFFIE-HELLMAN PROTOCOL 
“We stand today on the brink of a revolution in cryptography.”  This was 
the first sentence in a breakthrough paper published in 1977 by Whitfield Diffie 
and Martin E. Hellman.  In the paper, titled New Directions in Cryptography [10], 
the authors introduced the idea of public key cryptography and a key exchange 
protocol that was named in their honor.  The Diffie-Hellman protocol provided the 
first practical solution to the key distribution problem, allowing two parties, never 
having met in advance or shared keying material, to establish a shared secret by 
exchanging messages over an open channel.  The key can then be used to 
encrypt subsequent communications using a symmetric key cipher.  The security 
rests on the intractability of the Diffie-Hellman problem and the related problem of 
computing discrete logarithms [1].  We will call the two parties conducting the key 
exchange “Alice” and “Bob.” 
Protocol steps: 
1. A prime number p  and generator   of * (2 2)p p    are 
selected and published. 
2. Alice chooses a random secret ,1 2,x x p   and sends Bob 
modx p  
 : modxA B p  
3. Bob chooses a random secret ,1 2,y y p    and sends Alice 
mody p  
 : modyB A p  
4. Bob receives x  and computes the shared key as ( ) modx yK p  
5. Alice receives y  and computes the shared key as ( ) mody xK p  
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Because ( ) ( )y x x y  , Alice and Bob have arrived at the same secret 
key.  Only x , y , and xy  are kept secret.  All other values are sent in the 
clear.  The example below illustrates the procedure.   
1. Alice and Bob agree on 37p   and 2  .   
2. Alice chooses 14x   and sends Bob 1430( 2 mod37) .  
: 30A B  
3. Bob chooses 23y   and sends Alice  235( 2 mod37) . 
: 5B A  
4. Bob receives 30 and computes 2330 mod 37 28  
5. Alice receives 5 and computes 145 mod 37 28  
Alice and Bob have agreed upon 28 as their secret key.   
Figure 2 demonstrates which parties know what information.  The man-in-
the-middle will be called Eve from here on out. 
 
Alice 
Knows Does not Know 
p=37 y=23 
α=2   
x=14   
αx=30   
αy=5   









Figure 2.   Diffie-Hellman Example 
Bob 
Knows Does not Know
p=37 x=14 
α=2   
y=23   
αx=30   
αy=5   
(αx)y=K=28   
Eve 




αy=5   
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Obviously, a much larger value of p  is required than used in the example 
to make the key agreement potentially secure.  If the prime number 37  was 
used, Eve could simply try all possible values of 2 mod 37x y .  Because 2  is a 
primitive root modulo 37 , this can take 36  values.  A key space with only 36  
possibilities can be exhausted with ease.  However, if the prime number used is 
large enough, no computing power available today can exhaust the key space.  
For instance, most applications recommend 1024-bit primes [2].  This correlates 
to a number of about 300 digits and makes searching the key space one by one 
infeasible.  Table 4 demonstrates how long it would take a modern personal 
computer (PC) and a super-computer (SC) to exhaust various sizes of key 
spaces.  We assume a PC can search approximately one million ( 610 ) keys per 
second, while a super-computer can search approximately one trillion ( 1210 ) keys 
per second. 
For instance, if a prime of 64 bits was used, it would correlate to a base-
ten number of approximately 19 digits.  The key space would be all the numbers 







  seconds to completely search the entire key space. 




64 19 317,098 years 115 days 
128 39 3 x 10^(25) years 3 x 10^(19) years 
256 77 3 x 10^(63) years 3 x 10^(57) years 
512 154 3 x 10^(140) years 3 x 10^(134) years 
1024 308 3 x 10^(294) years 3 x 10^(288) years 
2048 616 3 x 10^(602) years 3 x 10^(596) years 
 
Table 4.   Times to Exhaust a Key Space 
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Considering most applications use prime of 1024 bits or greater, it is 
obviously infeasible to conduct a random search of an entire key space.  Of 
course, one could get lucky and the key could be one of the first numbers 
searched by the computer.  However, as indicated by the enormous times listed 
in the table, it is more likely a random key search would take longer than most 
scientists believe the universe has existed. 
B. THE DISCRETE LOGARITHM 
Eve has more information than just the fact that the key resides in the 
interval (1, 1)p  .  Because the exchange occurs over an open channel, Eve 
knows x  and y  as well.  If (mod )x p   and (mod )y p  , then p , ,  , 
and   are known.  All Eve has to do is solve (mod )x p   for x  or 
(mod )y p   for y .  Once x  or y  are known, Eve simply raises x  to y  or y  
to x  and arrives at the secret key K .  However, if p  is large, solving 
(mod )x p   for x  in general is considered difficult.  The problem of finding x  
in this case is known as the discrete logarithm problem (DLP), often 
abbreviated ( )x L  . 
The difficulty of solving the DLP yields useful cryptosystems.  Diffie-
Hellman key exchange protocol, El Gamal encryption system, and the Digital 
Signature Algorithm all rely on the difficulty of solving the DLP.  However, not all 
public-key crypto systems rely on the difficulty of the DLP.  Another number 
theory problem that yields cryptosystems is the problem of factoring large 
integers.  RSA, considered by many to be the most popular public-key 
cryptography algorithm, relies on the difficulty of factorization for its security.  The 
size of the largest primes for which discrete logs can be computed has usually 
been approximately the same size as the size of largest integers that could be 
factored [11].  In 2005, a 168 digit prime (556 bits) discrete logarithm was 
computed, setting a record at that time.  The record factorization up to then was 
200 digits (663 bits). 
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As discussed above, if p  is small, it is easy to compute discrete logs by 
exhaustive search.  However, when is p  large, this is not feasible.  We will now 
discuss several methods of attacking the DLP.    
1. The Pohlig-Hellman Algorithm 
Pohlig and Hellman introduced the following algorithm in 1978 to solve 




p q   
is the factorization of 1p   into primes.  Let rq  be one of the factors.  The idea is 
to compute x (mod )rq  for each iriq  and combine them using the Chinese 
Remainder Theorem to find the discrete logarithm.   
Thus, x (mod )rq  is found by writing 20 1 2 ...x x x q x q     with 0 1ix q    and 
determining the coefficients 0 1 1, ,..., rx x x  .   
General idea:  Starting with x  , raise both sides to the 1p
q
  to obtain  
 
2
0 01 2( 1)/ ( 1)/...( 1)/ ( 1)/ 1( )x p q x p qx q x qp q x p q p            (mod )p  
To find 0x , simply look at the powers  
 ( 1)/k p q   (mod )p , 0,1, 2,... 1,k q   
until one of them yields ( 1)/p q  .  Then 0x k .   
An extension of this idea yields the remaining coefficients.  Assume 2 | 1q p  .  Let 
 0 1 2( ...)1
x q x x q       (mod )p  
Raise both sides to the 2
1p
q
  power to obtain  
 
2
2 31 2 1 1...( 1)( ...)/ ( 1)/ ( 1)/( 1)/ 1
1 ( )
x x qp x x q q x p q x p qp q p              (mod )p . 
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To find 1x , simply look at the powers  
 ( 1)/k p q   (mod )p , 0,1, 2,... 1,k q   
Until one of them yields 
2( 1)/
1
p q  .  Then 1x k .   
If 3 | 1q p  , let 12 1 x q    , and raise both sides to the 3 1pq
  power and find 2x .  
We can continue this process until we find that 1rq   does not divide 1p  .  We 
have then determined 0 1 1, ... rx x x  , so we know x (mod )
rq . 
Repeat this procedure for all prime factors of 1p  .  This yields x (mod )rq  
for each iriq  and we combine these using the Chinese Remainder Theorem to 
find x (mod 1)p  .  Since 0 1x p   , this determines x . 
As an example, let us solve 2 3x   (mod101)  for x .  
 2 21 100 2 5p      so 2,5q   
First, we solve 2 3x   2(mod 2 ) .  Let 0 12x x x   2(mod 2 ) .  Then 
 ( 1)/2 503 1p      (mod101)  and ( 1)/2 502 1p      (mod101)  
So 01 ( 1)x    and 0 1x  . 
Continuing, 0 11 3 2 3 51 52
x         (mod101) . So 2( 1)/2 251 52 1p    (mod101)  
and 11 ( 1)x  .  So 1 0x   and 1 2 0 1x      2(mod 2 ) . 
Next, we solve 2 3x   2(mod5 ) .  Let 0 15x x x   2(mod5 ) .  Then 
 ( 1)/5 203 84p     (mod101)  and ( 1)/5 202 95p     (mod101)  
We make a list,  
 0 1 2 3 495 1;95 95;95 36;95 87;95 84      (mod101) . 
Matching with the list, we see that 0 4x  . 
Continuing, we get 0 41 3 2 3 19 57
x         .  So 2( 1)/5 41 57 87p    (mod101) . 
We again compare with the above list and see that 395 3  and 1 3x  .  This leads 
to 4 5 3 19x      2(mod5 ) . 
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Now, we combine 1x   2(mod 2 )  and 19x   2(mod5 )  using the Chinese 
Remainder Theorem to find 69x  .  So 692 3  (mod101) . 
It is well known that the time complexity of the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm is 
( )O p  [11]. 
2. Baby Step, Giant Step 
Eve is trying to solve (mod )x p   for x.  The following algorithm was 
developed by Daniel Shanks [11].   
First, choose an integer N  with 2 1N p  . Next, make two lists: 
1.  modj p  for 0 j N   
2.  modNk p   for 0 k N   
Look for a match between the two lists.  If one is found, then j Nk   , 
so j Nk   .  Therefore, x j Nk   and the discrete logarithm is solved.   
The complexity of the baby step, giant step algorithm is also ( )O p , but it 
requires storing approximately p  numbers in memory and is therefore, 
impractical for very large primes, such as 2010 or larger [11]. 
3. The Index Calculus 
Again, Eve is trying to solve (mod )x p   for x .  The idea in the index 
calculus method is similar to the quadratic sieve method of factoring [11].   
The first step is a precomputation step and involves picking a factor base 
and searching for a set of r  linearly independent relations between the factor 
base and the powers of  .  Let B   be a bound and let 1 2, ,..., mp p p  be the primes 
less than B .  This is our factor base.  We then compute k  (mod )p  for r   values 
  28
of k .  For each number, try to write it as a product of the factor base.  If this is not 
the case, discard k .  However, if iak ip   (mod )p , then 
 ( )i ik a L p  (mod 1)p  . 
When we obtain enough relations, we can solve for ( )iL p  for each i .   
Next, for random integers s , compute s  (mod )p .  For each such 
number, try to write it as a product of primes less than B .  If we succeed, we 
have ibs ip   (mod )p , which means 
 ( ) ( )i iL s b L p      (mod 1)p  . 
Using this algorithm, any p  over 200 digits will be difficult to solve, which 
makes the Index Calculus good only for moderate-sized primes [11].  One can 
show that the time complexity of the Index Calculus is 
1/3 2/3(ln ) ( ln )( )c n Cn nO e  for some 
0c  , if implemented by the Number Field Sieve.   
C. THE DIFFIE-HELLMAN PROBLEM 
We described how solving the discrete logarithm easily would allow Eve to 
arrive at the secret key.  There is another problem Eve can solve to arrive at the 
secret key—namely, the Diffie-Hellman Problem.  The Diffie-Hellman Problem 
comes in two flavors, the computational and the decisional.  The Computational 
Diffie-Hellman Problem is defined as follows:  Let p  be a prime and let   be a 
primitive root mod p .  Given (mod )x p  and (mod )y p , find (mod )xy p .  Recall 
that Eve has access to both x  and y  as they are both made public during the 
exchange.  It is not currently known whether or not this problem is easier than 
computing discrete logs [11].  A related problem, known as the Decisional 
Diffie-Hellman Problem, is defined as follows:  Let p  be a prime and let   be a 
primitive root mod p .  Given (mod )x p  and (mod )y p , and 0   (mod )p , 
decide whether or not (mod )xyK p [11].  In other words, if someone offers a 
number to Eve and claims it is K , can Eve decide whether or not that person is 
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telling the truth with the information captured in the open channel?  Like the 
computational Diffie-Hellman problem, the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem has 
yet to be solved.  It is unknown whether a method for solving the decisional 
problem will lead to a solution for the computational problem. 
The methods described for solving discrete logarithms above force 
applications that rely on the difficultly of solving discrete logs to stay away from 
certain primes.  Obviously, the larger the prime used, the better.  Baby-step 
Giant-step and the Index Calculus become infeasible to use when primes are 
larger than 200 digits.  The Pohlig-Hellman algorithm relies on the factorization of 
1p   to consist of only small primes.  If p  does not contain only small primes, 
the algorithm becomes inefficient.  Therefore, the primes chosen when using the 
Diffie-Hellman protocol should contain at least one large prime in the factorization 
of 1p  .  This situation gives rise to the attack we will focus on.  If 1p   contains 
a very large prime, such that 1p Rq   with q  prime and R  a small integer, an 
unauthenticated exchange becomes vulnerable to an active man-in-the-middle 
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IV. MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACK 
A. THEORY BEHIND THE ATTACK  
Wiener and van Oorschot [2] noted that, if certain primes are used, a 
potentially fatal protocol attack on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol 
becomes possible.  The idea is based on forcing the parties to agree on a shared 
key that resides in a subgroup of the cyclic group *p . If the order of the 
subgroup is small enough, an adversary can exhaustively search the subgroup, 
retrieve the secret key, and eavesdrop on the communication of Alice and Bob. 
For instance, consider the case when the prime used for the key 
exchange is of the form 2 1p q  , where q is a prime.  Then, ( 1)/2q p   .    
Claim: ( 1)/2p   is an element of order two. 
Proof: By Fermat’s little theorem, 1 1p    mod p .  So ( 1)/2p  must be +1 or 
-1.  But if ( 1)/2 1p    then   must have order ( 1) / 2p  .  This is a contradiction, 
because   is a primitive root of *p  and must be of order 1p  .  So ( 1)/2 1p     
and is an element of order two.        
If Alice and Bob respectively send each other unauthenticated messages 
x  and y , an active intruder may substitute ( )x q  for the first, and ( )y q for the 
second.  When Alice receives ( )y q  and computes ( )q y x  and when Bob 
receives ( )x q  and computes ( )qx y , they will arrive at only one of two possible 
values, +1 and -1.  The intruder can then try both possible keys and gain access 
to Alice and Bob’s secret communications.  Obviously, if Alice and Bob 
demonstrate vigilance, they will agree in advance to suspect any key agreement 
that arrives at +1 or -1.   
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We can generalize the situation if Alice and Bob use a prime number of 
the form 1p Rq  , where R  is a small integer and q  is again a large prime. 
Claim:  
( 1)/p R  is an element of order R .  
Proof:  Raising ( 1)/p R   to consecutive powers, starting with 0, we get: 
( 1)/ 0( ) 1p R   , ( 1)/ 2( )p R  , ( 1)/ 3( )p R  , …. , ( 1)/ ( 1)( ) 1p R R p    .   
This produces a list of R  different values. Continuing after R , 
( 1)/ ( 1) ( 1)/ ( 1)/ 1 ( 1)/( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( )p R R p R R p R p R           , 
( 1)/ ( 2) ( 1)/ ( 1)/ 2 ( 1)/ 2( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( )p R R p R R p R p R           , ……. , 
( 1)/ ( ) ( 1)/ ( 1)/ ( 1)/( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( )p R R n p R R p R n p R n            
For n R , the results are in the original list. 
For n R , we can write R n R kR m     with 0 1m R    and ,m k . 
( 1)/ ( ) ( 1)/ ( ) ( 1)/ ( 1)/ ( 1)/( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )p R R n p R R kR m p R R p R kR p R m               
 
( 1)/ ( 1)/1 1 ( ) ( )k p R m p R m       
Because 0 1m R   , this is in our original list and ( 1)/p R   is of order R .       
So, if the prime Alice and Bob agree to use is of the form 1p Rq  , Eve 
can force them to agree on a key in a subgroup of *p  of order R  by replacing 
x  and y  with ( )x q  and ( )y q .  Even if Alice and Bob are vigilant, the key can 
take any of R  values and the generalized attack poses a significant threat to an 
unauthenticated key exchange using the Diffie-Hellman protocol. 
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B. CREATING THE ENVIRONMENT 
Eve must force Alice and Bob into a subgroup of small order to conduct 
this attack.  Figure 3 represents a possible algorithm Eve could follow.   
NOTE:  Eve only needs to consider cases when R  is even, because if R  is odd, 
1p
R
 , must be even and cannot be prime. Also, if Eve calculates 1,p m
m
   as 
a non-integer, she can obviously ignore trying any number of the form 1,p k
km
   





Figure 3.   Attack Algorithm 





 , 2, 4,...,k R , until we find a prime.  We cannot continue the 
attack until we find such a prime.  Obviously, the longer Alice and Bob are kept 
waiting for return correspondence, the more suspicious they will become of 




possible method to detect primality.  From our discussion in Chapter II, we know 
a probabilistic primality test suits us best.  Specifically, we could use the Miller-
Rabin primality test with complexity  3(log )O n . 
If we are forced to search the entire index k  from 2 k R  , how long 
might this take us?  Recall that we only need try even values of k , and in the 
worst case, we may be forced to try all / 2R  even numbers.  Therefore, the worst 
case scenario in searching for a prime would take 
 









O R N O N   

 
steps, with N  being the input number into the Miller-Rabin primality test.  Thus 
the constant value in the Big-O estimate changes, but the algorithm remains 
bounded by the time it takes to conduct the primality tests. 
As an example, suppose Eve was listening to Alice and Bob agree upon 
the prime number to use for their key exchange to take place in the near future.  
The prime number they choose is 10007p   with a primitive root of 3  .  Eve 
uses the attack algorithm in Figure 4 to attempt to force Alice and Bob to agree to 
a key in a subgroup of *10007 .   
First, 1 10006 5003
2 2
p     
Next, Eve runs 5003  through the Miller-Rabin primality test and the result 
is prime. 
This situation represents the initial case described above with the prime 
number being of the form 2 1p q  .  Specifically, 10007 2 5003 1   .  Next, Eve 
must intercept the number Alice attempts to send to Bob.  Suppose Alice 
chooses 758x   and attempts to send 758(3 mod10007 4865)x   to Bob. 
: 4865A E  
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Eve intercepts the communication, then takes (4865)x  and raises it to the 
q  power. 
 758 5003( ) (3 ) mod10007x q   
Meanwhile, Eve must also intercept the number Bob is attempting to send 
to Alice.  Suppose Bob chooses 555y   and attempts to send 
555(3 mod10007 1771)y   to Alice. 
 :1771B E  
Eve again intercepts the communication, and takes (1771)y  and raises it 
to the q  power. 
 555 5003( ) (3 ) mod10007y q   
Eve then sends the results to the intended recipients. 
 : 4865 mod10007qE B  
 :1771 mod10007qE A  
Alice and Bob then both finish the key agreement by raising the received 
number to their private keys, x  and y  respectively, and arrive at the same 
number, the “secret” key.   
 ( ) ( )yq x xq y   
As a result of the theory discussed above, without any knowledge of x  or 
y , Eve knows the only possible keys are 1 and 10006 .  Eve must wait for a 
message to be sent between Alice and Bob, try both keys, and figure out which 
one is being used.  She can then eavesdrop, and Alice and Bob’s secret 
communication has been compromised.   
However, as mentioned before, any vigilance on the part of Alice or Bob 




Now, suppose the prime number Alice and Bob agreed upon was  
19991p   and 3a  .  Eve must again search for a large prime factor of 1p  . 
First, 1 19990 9995
2 2
p     
Next, Eve would run 9995  through the Miller-Rabin primality test.  
However, because it ends with a five, five must be a factor and it cannot be a 
prime number.   
Continuing,  1 19990 4997.5
4 4
p     is not an integer. 
1 19990 3333.66
6 6
p     is not an integer. 
Because 1
4
p   was not an integer, we skip 1
8
p  . 
1 19990 1999
10 10
p     
Next, Eve runs 1999  through the Miller-Rabin primality test and the result 
is prime. 
Eve has found a large prime factor of 1p  .  This situation resembles the 
generalized attack with a prime of the form 1p Rq  ; in this case 
19991 10 1999 1   .  Intercepting, altering, and retransmitting the messages as 
she did above, Eve again forces Alice and Bob into a subgroup of the original 
cyclic group.  This time, however, there are ten possibilities for the “secret” key. 
 
1 21 1 1
, ,...,
Rp p p
R R R  
                  
 
      1 2 101999 1999 19993 , 3 ,..., 3  
The cyclic subgroup of *19991  generated by 19993  is of order ten and Alice 
and Bob can only arrive at ten values for their key.  Eve must wait for Alice and 
Bob to communicate with their new key and see which of the ten values Alice 
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and Bob agreed on.  Once a message is intercepted, Eve can pull it offline, 
attempt each possible key, determine the key they agreed upon, and listen in on 
Alice and Bob’s communication. 
C. PRIMES OF THE FORM 1Rq   
For this man-in-the-middle attack to be possible, Alice and Bob must 
agree to choose a prime of the form 1Rq  .  How likely is it, assuming Alice and 
Bob are using random large primes, that the prime they choose will be of the 
correct form?  To answer this question, we must first count the number of primes 
p , such that 1p Rq  .  We can begin with the case where 2R  .  This 
represents the original case in the man-in-the-middle attack, where 2 1p q  .  
These particular prime numbers have their own name.  A prime p  is a so-called 
Sophie Germaine (SG) prime if 2 1p   is also prime.  If we let ( )SG t  be the 
number of SG primes not exceeding t , it can be demonstrated that  
2( ) (log )SG
tt O
t
       [13] 
Now, considering the general case, if we fix R , then the number of primes p t  
of the form 1p Rq   is  
2( )(log( / ))
tO
R t R
      
where ( )t  is Euler’s Phi function [14].  However, in the attack R  can range from 
2 to some bound, say B .  Therefore, we must sum the cases from 2R   to 
R B .  The number of primes p  such that 1p Rq   with q  prime, ranging from 
2 R B   with 1/2B t  is 
2
1
(log ) ( )R B
tO
t R






      [14] 
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The prime number theorem states that, if ( )x is the prime counting 





  .  Roughly speaking, this tells us that if you 
randomly select a number close to a large number N , the odds of it being prime 







  .  
If we let 1( )Rq t   count the number of primes of the form 1p Rq   not exceeding 











   
as well.  This tells us that, as x  gets very large, 
the likelihood that a random prime number is a Sophie Germaine Prime or any 
prime of the form 1Rq   is increasingly unlikely. 
Using the prime number theorem and Big-O estimates above with a 
constant value of one, we can approximate the numbers of primes of different 
forms.  Table 5 lists these approximations using scientific notation.  The R  value 
corresponds to different values for primes of the form 1p Rq  .  The ratios listed 
are:  (primes of the given form) / (total primes). 
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 0-64 bits 64-128 bits 128-256 bits 
Total Primes 4.1583e17 3.8353e36 6.5255e74 
R=2 (S.G) 9.3737e15 
ratio:  .0225 
4.3228e34 
ratio:  .0113 
3.6775e72 
ratio:  .0056 
R=100 4.316e16 
ratio:  .1038 
1.9907e35 
ratio:  .0519 
1.6935e73 
ratio:  .0260 
R=10^4 8.6335e16 
ratio:  .2076 
3.9815e35 
ratio:  .1038 
3.3871e73 
ratio:  .0519 
R=10^6 1.295e17 
ratio:  .3114 
5.9722e35 
ratio:  .1557 
5.0806e73 
ratio:  .0779 
 256-512 bits 512-1024 bits 1024-2048 bits 
Total Primes 3.778e151 2.5327e305 2.2765e613 
R=2 (S.G.) 1.0646e149 
ratio:  .0028 
3.5683e302 
ratio:  .0014 
1.6037e610 
ratio:  .0007 
R=100 4.9024e149 
ratio:  .0130 
1.6433e303 
ratio:  .0065 
7.3853e610 
ratio:  .0032 
R=10^4 9.8049e149 
ratio:  .0260 
3.2865e303 
ratio:  .0130 
1.477e611 
ratio:  .0065 
R=10^6 1.4707e150 
ratio:  .0389 
4.9298e303 
ratio:  .0195 
2.2156e611 
ratio:  .0097 
 
Table 5.   Prime Number Approximations 
The approximations demonstrate the increasing unlikelihood of a random 
prime being of the form 1p Rq  .  Using our approximations, around 64 bits 
over 30% of all primes match the form with a bound of 10^6.  However, when we 
consider primes around 2048 bits, the percentage drops below one.  If we 
increase the bound we can increase the likelihood, but increasing the bound 
forces the attacker to search through more keys to find the correct one.   
D. COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST THE ATTACK 
To prevent this potentially fatal protocol attack, Alice and Bob have 
several options.  The easiest method is to force authentication prior to the key 
exchange.  Another method that prevents the attack is based on creating a prime 
order subgroup before the key exchange takes place.   
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1. Authentication 
The attack we have discussed is not the only man-in-the-middle attack 
Diffie-Hellman is vulnerable to.  The Appendix details another attack, if no 
authentication occurs prior to the key exchange.  To combat these attacks, a 
variation of Diffie-Hellman that ensures authentication can be used.  An example 
of such a variation is the Station-to-Station protocol (STS).  STS is a three-pass 
variation of the basic Diffie-Hellman protocol that allows the establishment of a 
shared secret key between two parties with mutual entity authentication and 
mutual explicit key authentication [1].  The STS employs digital signatures.  A 
digital signature of a message is a number dependent on some secret known 
only to the signer; and, additionally, on the content of the message being signed 
[1].  The STS protocol is frequently employed with the RSA signature scheme. 
To employ an RSA signature scheme, public and private key pairs must 
first be generated. 
RSA signature scheme key generation steps [1]:  
1. Generate two large distinct random primes p  and q , each 
roughly the same size 
2. Compute n pq  and ( 1)( 1)p q      
3. Select a random integer ,1e e   , such that gcd( , ) 1e    
4. Use the extended Euclidean algorithm to compute the unique 
integer ,1d d    such that 1ed   (mod )  
5. The user’s public key is ( , )n e  and the user’s private key is d  
NOTE:  Each user should generate a public and private key 
Now, if a user Alice wants to sign a message m , and a user Bob wants to 




RSA signature scheme protocol steps [1] 
1. Signature generation 
a. Compute ( )m R m , an integer in the range [0, 1]n   
b. Compute modds m n   
c. Alice’s signature for m  is s . 
2. Signature verification 
a. Obtain Alice’s authentic public key ( , )n e  
b. Compute modem s n  
c. Recover 1( )m R m   
With the knowledge of a digital signature scheme, in particular RSA, we 
can move onto the STS protocol.  If we let E  denote a symmetric encryption 
algorithm, and ( )AS m  denote Alice’s signature on m , the protocol is as follows 
[1]: 
1. Set up 
a. A prime number p  and generator   of * (2 2)p p    are 
selected and published 
b. Alice selects RSA public and private signature keys ( , )A An e , 
and Ad  (Bob selects analogous keys).  Assume each party 
has access to authentic copies of the other’s public key. 
2. Actions 
a. Alice generates a secret random ,1 2x x p    and sends to 
Bob modx p . 




b. Bob generates a secret random ,1 2y y p   , and 
computes the shared key ( ) modx yk p .  Bob signs the 
concatenation of both exponentials, encrypts this using the 
computed key, and sends to Alice. 
 : mod , ( ( , ))y y xk BB A a p E S    (message 2) 
c. Alice computes the shared key ( ) mody xk p , decrypts the 
encrypted data, and uses Bob’s public key to verify the 
received value as the signature on the hash of the cleartext 
exponential received and the exponential sent in message 1.  
Upon successful verification, Alice accepts that k  is actually 
shared with Bob, and sends Bob an analogous message. 
 : ( ( , ))x yk AA B E S    (message 3) 
d. Bob similarly decrypts the received message and verifies 
Alice’s signature therein.  If successful, Bob accepts that k  
is actually shared with Alice. 
The exchanged exponentials are digitally signed and retransmitted during 
the STS protocol.  Therefore, Eve cannot alter the original exponentials without 
triggering a failure during Alice and Bob’s key agreement.  This precludes the 
man-in-the-middle attack we have focused on and defends Alice and Bob’s key 
exchange against several other possible active man-in-the-middle attacks. 
2. Prime Order Subgroups  
Van Oorschot and Wiener [2] noticed the potentially fatal man-in-the-
middle attack and reasoned that restricting computations to prime-order 
subgroups would prevent the attack.  In this case, we will force the prime number 
p  that defines the environment to be of the form 1p Rq  , where R  is a small 
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integer and q  is a large prime.  Now, instead of using a generator   of *p  as 
our base for exponentiation, we compute ( 1)/p qg    and let g  be our new base.   
 Claim:  The element g  generates a subgroup of order q . 
 Proof:  Suppose g  is of order k q  and so 1kg  .  Then ( 1) / 1p k q    .  But 
/ 1k q   and so ( 1) / ( 1)p k q p    .  This means   is of order ( 1)p  , a 
contradiction because   is a generator of *p .  Therefore, g  must be of order 
q .  But ( 1) / ( 1) 1q p q q pg       , so g  is of order q  and g  is an subgroup of 
order q .            
By using g  instead of   to conduct the key exchange, Alice and Bob are 
working in a prime order subgroup instead of a group of order 1p  .  The man-in-
the-middle attack we have discussed is based on forcing the parties into a 
subgroup of small order and exhaustively searching the smaller key space.  
However, by Lagrange’s theorem, the order of any subgroup must divide the 
order of the group.  The order of the group generated by g  is q .  Therefore, any 
subgroup must be of order q  or 1, because those are the only divisors of q .  
Thus, the prime order subgroup cannot be divided any further and this man-in-
the-middle attack becomes infeasible.   
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has adopted the prime order 
subgroup tactic to prevent the type of attack we have focused on.  In particular, 
Request for Comment (RFC) 2631 standardizes the technique for a particular 
Diffie-Hellman variant, based on the American National Standards Institute x9.42 
draft [15]. 
E. EXTENDING THE ATTACK TO THE N-PARTY SETTING 
The Diffie-Hellman protocol we have discussed so far has been limited to 
two parties.  However, protocols have been created that extend the key 
agreement to group communications.  Steiner, Tsudik and Wainer [16] defined a 
  45
class of natural extensions of Diffie-Hellman to the n-party setting.  These 
protocols, without the countermeasures discussed above, are vulnerable to the 
man-in-the-middle attack we have focused on.  We now move to demonstrate the 
attack on two of the protocols the authors describe. First, we consider the 
protocol the authors name Group Diffie-Hellman version 1 (GDH.1).  In this 
section, to keep with the original notation of [16], we use set notation to mean an 
ordered tuple. 
We call the participants of the n-party key exchange  1 2, ,..., nM M M .  As 
in the two-party case, a prime number p  and a generator   of the group *pZ  are 
selected and published.  Each member iM  chooses a random secret number 
,0 2i is s p   .  The protocol consists of two stages; upflow and downflow. 
In the upflow stage, each member makes their contribution to the shared 
key.  A member iM  receives a collection of intermediate values, and has the task 
of raising the last in the list of incoming intermediate values to the power of is .  
Then iM  appends the result to the incoming set of values and forwards all to 
1iM  .  As an example, 3M  would receive  1 1 2,s s s   from 2M .  3M  would then 
compute 1 2 3s s s , append the result to the incoming message to create 
 1 2 31 1 2, , s s ss s s    and forward to 4M .   
The upflow stage is completed when nM  calculates 1 2
... ns s s , which is the 
intended group key, nK .  Once nM  has obtained nK , the downflow stage is 
initiated.  Each member iM  receives i  messages, one to compute nK  and 1i   
to send to 1iM  .  For example, if 4n  , 3M  would receive  4 1 4 1 2 4, ,s s s s s s    from 
4M .  First, 3M  would use the last value to compute 1 2 3 4
s s s s
nK  .  Then, the 
remaining values would be raised to 3s  and  4 3 1 4 3,s s s s s   would be sent to 2M .   
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2M  would repeat the procedure, and would send  4 3 2s s s  to 1M .  The downflow 
stage is then completed when 1M  computes 1 2 3 4
s s s s




Figure 4.   GDH.1 [From 16] 
The active adversary, Eve, wishes to attack the key agreement forcing the 
n-party to agree on a key in a small subgroup of *pZ .  Like in the two-party case, if 
possible Eve must first break the prime number p  down into the form 1p Rq   
with q  a large prime and R  a small integer.  Once completed, Eve must then 
intercept and alter two messages to complete the attack.  The first message she 
must intercept is the first message sent, that is,  
 11 2 :
sM M  . 
With 1s  captured, Eve computes  1 1( )s qsq   and proceeds to send the 
computed number as the message onto 2M .  2M  computes 1 2
qs s  and sends 
 1 1 2,qs qs s   to 3M . This continues until the end of the upflow stage, when nM  
computes 1... nqs s nK  .  Eve has forced nK  to be one of R  values, based on the 
theory of the attack described earlier in the chapter.   
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Next, Eve must intercept the first message sent during the downflow 
stage.  If 4n  , then  
  4 1 4 1 2 44 3 : , ,s qs s qs s sM M    . 
NOTE:  Because of the alteration Eve completed in the upflow stage, only the 
first part of the message must be altered. 
Eve simply computes 4qs , replaces the first number with the computation, 
and forwards the message to 3M .  The participants all arrive at 1 2 3 4
qs s s s
nK  , and 
the key exchange has been successfully attacked.  However, in this case Eve 
had to capture and alter two very specific messages for the attack to be 
successful.  In the next protocol, Eve has more flexibility. 
Next, we turn our attention to Group Diffie Hellman version 3 (GDH.3).  
GDH.3 reduces the amount of computation each party (except for nM ) must 
complete, which may be very beneficial if the group size is large.  The protocol 
consists of four stages.  The first stage is similar to the upflow stage of GDH.1 in 
which every member contributes to the key.  However, after processing the 
upflow message, 1nM   broadcasts 1 2 1
... ns s s   to the entire group as the second 
stage of the process.  In stage three, each iM , except nM  , factors out their 
contribution ( is ) from the broadcasted value and forwards the result to nM .  
After nM  collects all the values from the group, in the last stage nM  raises each 
value to ns  and returns the values to the group.  Now each iM  has 
[1, ],ks k n k i    
and simple raises this value to is  to compute nK .   
For example, if 5n  , the upflow stage completes when 4M  computes 
1 2 3 4s s s s .  Then, in stage 2, this value is broadcasted to the entire group.  In stage 
3, each member other than 5M  factors out their contribution and forwards the 
result to 5M  (i.e. 2M  would send 1 3 4
s s s ).  In stage 4, 5M raises each received  
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value to 5s  and returns the value to the sender (i.e. 2M  would receive 1 3 4 5
s s s s .  
Lastly, each member raises the received value to their secret number and arrives 
at nK .  Figure 5 depicts GDH.3. 
 
Figure 5.   GDH.3 [From 16] 
It is much easier for Eve to attack GDH.3 than GDH.1.  She needs only to 
intercept and alter one message, and she can choose any of the first 2i   
messages sent in the group.  By raising any one of these messages to q , 1nM   
will inevitably broadcast 1 2 1... nqs s s   to the group.  At this point, each member factors 
out their contribution, and forwards the result to nM  leaving q  in the exponent of 
each message sent.  nM  simply raises each message to ns  and returns each 
message.  Therefore, q  is undisturbed, each member arrives at the same key 
1 2 ... nqs s s
nK  , and Eve has successfully forced the group into a small number of 
  49
possible values for the key.  However, as mentioned above, if the parties agree 
to use either authentication or prime order subgroups during the key exchange, 
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V. RESULTS AND FUTURE WORK 
This thesis investigated and analyzed a particular man-in-the-middle 
attack on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol.  We created an algorithm to 
carry out the attack and demonstrated how it is constrained by the primality test 
used by the attacker.  In particular, if the Miller-Rabin primalty test is used, the 
algorithm’s complexity is  3(log )O N  with N  being the input prime number.  We 
showed that prime numbers of the form 1p Rq   with R  bounded are common 
with small primes but become increasingly rare as larger numbers are 
considered.  In fact, with low bit primes such as 128 bits, a reasonably-sized R  
will give an attacker a good chance of the prime being of the desired form.  
However, when large primes such as 1024 and 2048 bits are considered, a very 
large value of R  is required to give an attacker a reasonable chance of 
conducting the attack. We demonstrated how two techniques, authentication and 
prime order subgroups, can prevent the attack.  In fact, it appears industry has 
begun to adopt the prime order subgroup technique to defend against the attack.  
Finally, we demonstrated how the attack can be expanded to include a class of 
multi-party Diffie-Hellman variants. 
Possible future efforts include coding and implementing the man-in-the-
middle attack on active communications to test the theory laid out in this thesis.  
It is possible that analyzing the given prime number, capturing the required 
messages, altering those messages, and forwarding the messages to the 
intended recipients will be too time-consuming.  This would obviously alert the 
parties of possible compromise.  In addition, it may be possible to alter the attack 
to compromise communications that are authenticated and render several Diffie-
Hellman variants such as the STS protocol vulnerable.  Other future work may 
include an attempt to defeat the prime order subgroup technique. 
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APPENDIX:  ANOTHER MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACK 
This appendix details a possible man-in-the-middle attack on the Diffie-
Hellman key exchange protocol, if no prior authentication occurs [17].   
1) Alice sends her public key to Bob, but Eve intercepts it, and Bob 
never receives the key. 
2) Eve spoofs Alice’s identity and sends over her public key to Bob.  
Bob now thinks that he has Alice’s public key. 
3) Bob sends his public key to Alice, but Eve intercepts it, and Alice 
never receives the key. 
4) Eve spoofs Bob’s identity and sends over her public key to Alice.  
Alice now thinks that she has Bob’s public key. 
5) Alice combines her private key and Eve’s public key and creates 
symmetric key S1. 
6) Eve combines her private key and Alice’s public key and creates 
symmetric key S1. 
7) Bob combines his private key and Eve’s public key and creates 
symmetric key S2. 
8) Eve combines her private key and Bob’s public key and creates 
symmetric key S2. 
9) At this point, Alice and Eve share a symmetric key (S1) and Bob 
and Eve share a different symmetric key (S2).  Alice and Bob think 
they are sharing a key between themselves and do not realize that 
Eve is involved. 
10)  Alice writes a message to Bob, uses her symmetric key (S1) to 
encrypt the message, and sends it. 
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11)  Eve intercepts the message and decrypts it with the symmetric key 
S1, reads or modifies the message and re-encrypts it with 
symmetric key S2, and sends it to Bob. 
12)  Bob takes symmetric key S2 and uses it to decrypt and read the 
message. 




Figure 6.   Another Man-in-the-Middle Attack 
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